The trade of the Western industrial states with Eastern Europe has been the object of keen political interest in the past year or two although It accounts for no more than 5-6 p,c. of the total foreign commerce of the OECD countries. The current discussion about the future of the economic relations between East and West focuses on the greatly increased indebtedness of the East European countries to the West. The following review was presented as the introductory paper at a colloquium on the state and trends of East-West relations which was held at the end of February at the invitation of the Senator of Economic Affairs of Hamburg.
T he indebtedness of East Europe is today undoubtedly the issue of cardinal interest to those concerned in business transactions with the East. The size and nature of the total East European indebtedness to the Western world are such that it has to be taken into consideration in all reflections -also from a national point of view -about the future development of the economic relations between East and West. In this respect the situation differs from what it was in previous years.
The justification of stepping up the discussion about credits for Eastern Europe has been questioned, especially in East European quarters: when two regions exchange more goods, so runs the main argument, proportionally larger credits are needed to finance the increased trade. The following figures show however very vividly that the credits for the East call for special treatment because of the quantitative relations if for no other reason. Especially is this so in the Federal Republic of Germany: within four years the export surplus earned by the Federal Republic from its trade with Eastern Europe has risen fourfold in relation to its total foreign trade surplus -from only 4.8 p.c. in 1971 to 20.8 p.c. in 1975 (for 1976 it is estimated at 19.0 p.c.). The Federal Republic's exports to the East (excl. the GDR) also increased relatively more than its total exports (by customer and buyer countries) but not nearly as much as the surplus, namely from 3.6 p.c. in 1971 to 6.6 p.c. in 1975 (the estimate for 1976 is 6.1 p.c.). That such a development will conduce to problems of finance is fairly obvious.
Various state and bank credits were conceded to Eastern Europe in the sixties already in addition to the short-and medium-term suppliers' credits which are customarily provided in international trade. France, Great Britain, Italy and the USA were the Western countries mainly concerned; the Federal Republic was still playing a minor role. It is impossible to give precise data; for the end of 1971 the total East European debt (excl. the Soviet Union)to the West has been estimated very roughly at about US$ 7 bn. 1 But it was never felt that the volume of indebtedness was presenting a problem. Nevertheless the countries concerne~l were almost incessantly involved in controversies about the terms for these credits because they used them to different degrees as a competitive weapon. The discussion in those years about duration of such credits, number of grace years, rates of interest, nature and extent of any insurance cover, etc., has not been brought to a real conclusion yet. In the sixties it proved impossible to agree on more than desultory consultations. 2 As for last year's gentlemen's agreement on REPORT guidelines for export credit terms between several important Western industrial states (the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, the USA and Japan), it remains to be seen what effects it will have. Bearing in mind how large the indebtedness has grown by now and considering further that substantial credit facilities were arranged for Eastern Europe (about US8 10 bn are still available to the Soviet Union until 1980) before the gentlemen's agreement, it is improbable that even without such an accord there would ever have been a real danger of the Western countries engaging in ruinous credit competition for East European contracts.
The Debt Situation
In the absence of comprehensive official debt surveys the East European borrowing in the West has been the subject of various estimates in the past two years. Although not free from contradictions and obscurities, these estimates have been received with amazement because of the magnitude and progression of the indebtedness indicated by them. The source for many of the data "bandied" in the West is Brainard 3 of the Chase Manhattan Bank. International organizations (OECD, ECE, BIS) are also doing intensive work to elucidate the effective indebtedness of East Europe. They are rather reluctant to publish their findings but to go by what has become known there are no very wide differences between the more serious estimates. The picture emerging from the data available from various sources is as follows: The gross indebtedness of Eastern Europe (incl. the GDR debt to the Federal Republic) -the East European reserves are not taken into account -was at the Widely differing views are taken of this development in regard to the element of risk attending further credits. Formal quotas are very often mentioned in this context but would probably be of little use because of the lack to date of any generally valid criteria for the formulation of credit limits. It has been said for instance that if the annual interest and redemption payments do not exceed 25 p.c. of the annual exports from the debtor country its debtor status is satisfactory. This limit was probably reached about the end of 1975. In the case of the Soviet Union this so-called debt servicing ratio increased, according to American estimates, from 15 p.c. only in 1974 to 20 p.c. in 1975. The ratio of net indebtedness to exports is also often used as a pointer. In 1975 the total net indebtedness of Eastern Europe exceeded the exports from the area by 50 p.c.; in 1974 the two figures have still been equal. Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary and the Soviet Union were the countries chiefly concerned in this ratio deterioration 4
Credit Category Changes
The borrowings by Eastern Europe are being watched with close interest and even some concern not only because of the magnitude of the credits involved by now but, especially, because of the changes in the form of credits. In the past the bulk of the borrowing took the form of suppliers' credits and inter-bank loans relating to certain supply contracts. From about 1973 onwards the aim has been to draw -to a certain not definitely ascertainable extent -on financial credits which are not tied to specific contracts. Some of these credits are loans by one bank to another, but a large part of them takes the special form of a Eurocredit. Euro-market credits to Eastern Europe accounted, according to DIW, Berlin, by the end of 1975 for about half the total gross and net indebtedness -namely, US$19 and 14 bn respectively out of a total of US$ 34 and 28 bn. 5 The DIW definition of the Euro-market seems to be too wide. The ECE which uses a much narrower definition puts the net amount of East European borrowings from the Euro-money market for 1974 at only US$ 4.8 bn. However, even on this narrower definition the Euro-credit volume seems to have increased considerably because of the activities in 1975 and 1976 of not only the individual CMEA countries but, especially, the CMEA Bank for Economic Cooperation (IBEC). The World Bank which has been keeping a close watch on the Euro-market in the past few years calculates the accumulated credit 4 cf. Heinrich Machowski, Abbau des Ungleichgewichts im Ost-West-Handel (Abolition of the disequilibrium in East-West trade), in: DIW-Wochenbericht, Vol. 43 (1976) , No. 39, p. 362. s ibid., p. 361.
